Israeli nuclear deterrence
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Israeli nuclear deterrence a strategy for the 1980s by Shai Feldman

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Published by Columbia University Press in New York, Guildford .
Written in English


  • Atomic weapons.,
  • Israel -- Military policy.

Book details:

Edition Notes

Bibliography, p281-297. - Includes index.

StatementShai Feldman.
LC ClassificationsUA853.I8
The Physical Object
Paginationxviii,310p. ;
Number of Pages310
ID Numbers
Open LibraryOL21198401M
ISBN 100231055463, 0231055471

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  As instruments of deterrence, nuclear weapons can succeed only in their protracted non-use. It follows from all this that Israel's nuclear weapons must consistently remain oriented to deterrence ex ante, and not to actual war fighting or revenge ex post. As instruments of deterrence, nuclear weapons can succeed only in their protracted non-use. The Israeli “Nuclear Alert” of Deterrence and Signaling in Crisis. Washington, D.C.: Center for Naval Analyses. Cold War International History Project Bulletin. “19 March , Resolution, USSR Council of Ministers with Draft Letters from Soviet Government to Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung and Directive to Soviet Delegation at Cited by: There are persuasive connections between more “open” Israeli strategic nuclear doctrine and certain enemy state perceptions of Israeli nuclear deterrence. One such connection centers on the relationship between greater openness and the perceived vulnerability of Israeli . Mad or “crazy” adversaries, on the other hand, would have no such calculable hierarchy of preferences, and would therefore not be subject to any ordinary strategy of Israeli nuclear deterrence. Although it would likely be worse for Israel to have to face a mad nuclear enemy than a “merely” irrational one, Jerusalem would have no.

Particularly in an entrenched conflict such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, where an ongoing asymmetric attrition campaign by resistance groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah is an enduring norm, such a policy is sensible and adequate. The ability for deterrence to completely dissuade all forms of violence is an impossible standard.   Upgrading Israeli nuclear deterrence; Core consequences of P5+1 agreement with Iran Current instabilities in the Middle East will generate compelling reasons for Israel to re-examine its. Israel's nuclear strategy after the Iran agreement. and Israeli nuclear deterrence. and is the author of many major books and articles dealing with Israeli nuclear strategy. For over This book develops an innovative framework to answer this question, viewing deterrence as an idea. This allows the author to explain how countries institutionalize deterrence strategy, and how this internalization affects policy. He argues that the US and Israel have both internalized deterrence ideas and become attached to these by: 7.